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Abstract
Selfish behavior at the Medium Access (MAC) Layer can have devastating side effects on the per-
formance of wireless networks, with effects similar to those of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In this
paper we consider the problem of detection and prevention of node misbehavior at the MAC layer, focus-
ing on the back-off manipulation by selfish nodes. We propose an algorithm that ensures honest behavior
of non-colluding participants. Furthermore, we analyze the problem of colluding selfish nodes, casting
the problem within a minimax robust detection framework, providing a detection rule of optimum per-
formance for the worst-case attack. Finally, we compare the effects of colluding attackers with a single
attacker in terms of the detection delay. Although our approach is general and can serve as a guideline
for the design of any probabilistic distributed MAC protocol, we focus our analysis on the IEEE 802.11
MAC.
1 Introduction
With the rise and flexibility of ubiquitous computing, new and unforeseeable ways of user interactions are
expected, such as establishing collaborative networks with minimum or almost no central control. One
such example can be the use of ad hoc networks for providing fast and efficient network deployment in a
wide variety of scenarios with no fixed networking infrastructure and where each node is its own authority.
However, in order for this interactions to reach their full potential, these networks should support minimum
security and performance guarantees defined by the end users. For example, some current P2P file-sharing
networks suffer from the abundance of corrupted files introduced by attackers and from selfish participants
who only download files but never share them with other users. These factors limit the utility of P2P file-
sharing networks as an efficient way to recover files.
The communication protocols in different layers of an ad hoc network can also be subject to manip-
ulation by selfish users. For example, the MAC protocol, the routing protocol and the transport protocol
were designed under the assumption that all participating nodes obey the given specifications. However,
when these protocols are implemented in an environment where each node has its own authority, nodes can
deviate from the protocol specification in order to obtain a given goal, at the expense of honest participants.
A selfish user for example, can disobey the rules to access the wireless channel in order to obtain a higher
throughput than the other nodes. A selfish user can also change the congestion avoidance parameters of
TCP in order to obtain unfair advantage over the rest of the nodes in the network [2]. In devices with limited
power resources, certain nodes might refuse to forward packets on behalf of other sources in order to save
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battery power [3]. In all these cases, the misbehaving nodes will degrade the performance of the network
from the point of view of the honest participants.
To fully address these problems, a layered reputation mechanism should be deployed in order to either
reward cooperation (e.g. payments) or penalize misbehaving nodes (e.g. revocation). In this paper we focus
on the detection of individual and colluding selfish users at the MAC layer in ad hoc networks.
1.1 Summary of Our Approach
In our approach we point out that a key element that facilitates misbehavior in contention based MAC layer
protocols is the fact that they are probabilistic distributed protocols. The random nature of these protocols
and the nature of the wireless medium makes the detection of misbehaving nodes very difficult, since it
is not easy for the detector to distinguish between a peer misbehavior, an occasional protocol malfunction
due to a wireless link impairment or a greedy back-off strategy. In order to facilitate the detection of a
single attacker, we propose the use of Blum’s coin flipping protocol [7] that facilitates the exchange of
a truly random parameter that can be used as a seed for a pseudoranom number generator. This allows
anyone who monitors the execution of the protocol to determine the exact source of randomness used by
the participating nodes and detect any deviations. We believe this idea facilitates the monitoring procedure
of misbehavior in any distributed probabilistic MAC layer protocol such as ALOHA [1], SEEDEX [23],
MACA [17], MACAW [6] and IEEE 802.11 [16].
Since we assume an ad hoc network where each node is its own authority, the usual assumption of a
trusted receiver (e.g. a base station) might no longer hold, and therefore we need to worry about colluding
nodes. However, the Blum’s scheme cannot be used in the detection of colluding nodes due to the large over-
head required for the randomness agreement among more than two nodes. Instead, we base our approach
on sequential detection procedures, placing the emphasis on the class of attacks that incur larger gain for the
attackers. This approach should also cope with the uncertain environment of a wireless network. Hence, we
adopt the minimax robust detection approach where the goal is to optimize performance for the worst-case
instance of uncertainty. More specifically, the goal is to identify the least favorable operating point of a
system in the presence of uncertainty and subsequently find the strategy the optimizes system performance
when operating in that point. In our case, the least favorable operating point corresponds to the worst-case
instance of an attack and the optimal strategy amounts to the optimal detection rule.
Our work contributes to the current literature by: (i) proposing a solution for preventing misbehavior of
a single intelligent node, (ii) formulating the problem of optimal detection against misbehavior of intelligent
colluding attackers (iii) quantifying performance losses incurred by an attack and defining an uncertainty
class such that the focus is only on attacks that incur ”large enough” performance losses, (iv) obtaining
analytical expressions for the worst-case attack and the optimal detection rule (and its performance), (v)
establishing an upper bound on number of required samples for detection of any of the attacks of interest.
Therefore our work constitutes a first step towards understanding the complex issue of collaboration among
colluding nodes in wireless networks, obtaining bounds on achievable performance and characterizing the
impact of different system parameters on it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related work dealing with MAC layer mis-
behavior. Section 3 deals with misbehavior in IEEE 802.11 DCF protocol. In Section 4 we present an
algorithm that prevents the manipulation of back-off values for a single selfish node. In Section 5 we an-
alyze the detection problem in the presence of colluding nodes. Following that, we present the minimax
robust detection model and basic assumptions and demonstrate our approach comparing the results with the
scenario that includes a single attacker. Finally, Section 6 concludes our study.
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2 Background Work
2.1 MAC Layer Misbehavior
The MAC layer in a communication network manages a multiaccess link (e.g., a wireless link) so that
frames can be sent by each node without constant interference from other nodes. MAC layer misbehavior is
possible in network access cards that run the MAC protocol in software rather than hardware or firmware,
allowing a selfish user or attacker to easily change MAC layer parameters. Even network interface cards
implementing most MAC layer functions in hardware and firmware usually provide an expanded set of
functionalities which can be exploited to circumvent the limitations imposed by the firmware [4]. In the
worst case scenario, an untrusted vendor might manufacture NIC cards violating the MAC protocol to create
an improved performance of its products.
In this work we assume that a selfish node in the MAC layer attempts to maximize its own throughput
and therefore keeps the channel busy. As a side effect of this behavior, regular nodes cannot use the channel
for transmission, which leads to a denial of service (DoS) attack [14].
Selfish misbehavior at the MAC layer has been addressed mostly from a game theoretic perspective
considering that all nodes are selfish. The goal in a game theoretic setting is to design distributed protocols
that guarantee the existence, uniqueness and convergence to a Nash equilibrium with an acceptable through-
put for each node. However, if users try to maximize their throughput, every node will attempt to transmit
continuously in such way that users deny access to any other node until the network collapses. This collapse
is in fact, a (very impractical) Nash equilibrium of the game. In order to obtain a more efficient Nash equi-
librium, each node needs to be assigned a cost for each time it accesses the channel. For example [19, 13]
consider the case of selfish users in Aloha that attempt to maximize their throughput and minimize the
cost for accessing the channel (e.g. energy consumption). Another game theoretic scheme for CSMA/CA
schemes is presented in [11]. Using a dynamic game model, the authors derive the strategy that each node
should follow in terms of controlling channel access probability by adjustment of contention window, so
that the network reaches its equilibrium. They also provide conditions under which the Nash equilibrium
of the network with several misbehaving nodes is Pareto optimal for each node as well. The underlying as-
sumption is that all nodes are within wireless range of each other so as to avoid the hidden terminal problem,
therefore this scheme is mostly intended for wireless LANs, as opposed to ad hoc networks.
Since game theoretic protocols assume all nodes are selfish (the worst case scenario), the throughput
achieved in these protocols is substantially less than in protocols where the honest majority cooperates.
Under the assumption of an honest majority, detection of misbehaving nodes becomes the primary goal in
dealing with misbehavior.
2.1.1 Detecting MAC layer misbehavior
Due to the popularity of the IEEE 802.11, most of the work in detecting MAC layer misbehavior has focused
in this protocol. A selfish user in the IEEE 802.11 can implement a whole range of strategies to maximize
its access to the medium. The most effective strategy that a selfish user can employ is to use different
schemes for manipulating the rules of the MAC layer. For example, the attacker can manipulate the size of
the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) and assign large idle time periods to its neighbors, it can decrease the
size of Interframe Spaces (both SIFS and DIFS), it can select small back-off values, it can deauthenticate
neighboring nodes etc. A successful detection scheme should take into account all possible cheating options
in the MAC layer and detect both: users that employ only one scheme and users that employ a combination of
several schemes (e.g. first choosing small back-off values, then assigning large NAV values to its neighbors
etc).
3
However, the most challenging detection task is that of detecting back-off manipulation [22, 4]. Due to
the randomness introduced in the choice of the back-off, it is difficult to decide if a node has chosen small
back-off values by chance or if the small back-off values are part of a misbehavior strategy. The back-off
detection scheme provided in [22] works well for adversaries that are unaware of the detection scheme,
however an intelligent adversary would try to maximize his own gain (e.g. throughput) while minimizing
the chances of being detected. [21] addresses this concern by providing a theoretical foundation for the
design of optimal detection schemes against intelligent adversaries. These algorithms however have only
focused on individual misbehaving nodes, and do not consider collusion.
Another approach for the detection of single misbehaving nodes was proposed in [18]. In this work,
the authors propose a modification to the IEEE 802.11 for facilitating the detection of misbehaving nodes.
In their scheme, the receiver (a trusted host -e.g. a base station-) assigns the back-off value to be used by
the sender. The receiver can therefore detect any misbehavior of the sender and penalize it by increasing
the back-off values for the next transmission. The protocol consists of Detection, Penalty and Diagnosis
Schemes. The sender is considered to be deviating from the protocol if the observed number of idle slots,
the actual back-off Bact , is smaller than a specified fraction α of the assigned (expected) back-off Bexp.
For a detected node, a penalty for the next assigned back-off is selected given a measure of the deviation
D = max(αBexp−Bact ,0). If the sender deviates repeatedly, i.e. if the sum of misbehavior in a sliding
window is bigger than some threshold, then the sender is labeled as misbehaving and the receiver takes
drastic measures, for example, by dropping all packets by the sender. However, as we have pointed out in
the introduction, the problem of applying this protocol in autonomous ad hoc networks is the fact that the
receiver might not be trusted.
2.2 Additional Assumptions for Detection in a Distributed Setting
The scenario presented in this work differs from the one presented in [18] due to the fact that we attempt to
solve the problem in the environment with no central authority. Consequently, the penalization of misbehav-
ing nodes by the central authority cannot be performed in our setting. Therefore a comprehensive strategy
against greedy behavior requires at least three steps: local detection of misbehaving nodes, information
propagation to other honest nodes in the network and response.
Upon local detection of misbehavior, the other major issue is propagation of the obtained information
throughout the network. Although a misbehaving node can be detected by our system, the detection mech-
anism opens a new opportunity for attacks since honest nodes can be falsely incriminated by an adversary,
imposing the new problem of obtaining secure information from a distributed reputation management sys-
tem, while maintaining accurate identification of the misbehaving identities and minimizing the probability
of false incrimination.
Finally, the system needs to react to the information gathered from the reputation system by other nodes.
The response can be either a reward for cooperation (e.g. payments) or the penalization of misbehaving
nodes (e.g. revocation). We note that response algorithms can be done more efficiently at different layers (as
opposed to doing response just at the MAC layer). For example, a possible response against selfish MAC
users is employment of a rate-limiting algorithm at the routing layer that limits the amount of traffic selfish
nodes can receive or send. The idea of reacting to MAC layer misbehavior at different layers (routing in this
case) coincides with the current interest of cross-layer design for wireless networks [24].
Overall, the issue of designing such a distributed reputation management system is a large and complex
subject by itself that has received much attention recently, [10, 9, 8, 26, 20, 25]. In this paper however, we
focus on the fundamental problem of local detection. This detection is accomplished by the involvement of
the neighboring nodes that monitor the behavior of both the sender and the receiver.
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We also note that all the schemes presented in the previous sections as well as the ones we propose,
require the proper use of MAC layer authentication schemes, providing uniquely verifiable identities in
order to prevent impersonation and Sybil attacks [12].
3 IEEE 802.11 DCF
The most frequently used MAC protocol for wireless networks is the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, which
uses a distributed contention resolution mechanism for sharing the wireless channel. Its design attempts to
ensure a relatively fair access to the medium for all participants of the protocol. In order to avoid collisions,
the nodes follow a binary exponential back-off scheme that favors the last winner amongst the contending
nodes.
In the distributed coordinating function (DCF) of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, coordination of chan-
nel access for contending nodes is achieved with carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA). A node with a packet to transmit selects a random back-off value b uniformly from the set
{0,1, . . . ,W −1}, where W is the (fixed) size of the contention window. The back-off counter decreases by
one at each time slot that is sensed to be idle and the node transmits after b idle slots. In case the channel
is perceived to be busy in one slot, the back-off counter stops momentarily. After the back-off counter is
decreased to zero, the transmitter can reserve the channel for the duration of data transfer. First, it sends a
request-to-send (RTS) packet to the receiver, which responds with a clear-to-send (CTS) packet. Thus, the
channel is reserved for the transmission. Both RTS and CTS messages contain the intended duration of data
transmission in the duration field. Other hosts overhearing either the RTS or the CTS are required to adjust
their network allocation vector (NAV) that indicates the duration for which they will defer transmission.
This duration includes the SIFS intervals, data packets and acknowledgment frame following the transmit-
ted data frame. An unsuccessful transmission instance due to collision or interference is denoted by lack of
CTS or ACK for the data sent and causes the value of contention window to double. If the transmission is
successful, the host resets its contention window to the minimum value W .

















Figure 1: Nodes A and C contend for accessing node B. The first time A reserves the channel, and in the
second time C accesses the channel.
Typical parameter values for the MAC protocol depend on the physical layer that IEEE 802.11 uses.









DATA MAC header (30b)+DATA(0-2312b)+FCS(4b)
Timeouts 300-350µs
CWmin 32 time slots
CWmax 1024 time slots
Table 1: Parameters for DSSS
IEEE 802.11 DCF favors the node that selects the smallest back-off value among a set of contending
nodes. Therefore, a malicious or selfish node may choose not to comply to protocol rules by selecting
small back-off intervals, thereby gaining significant advantage in channel sharing over regularly behaving,
honest nodes. Moreover, due to the exponential increase of the contention window after each unsuccessful
transmission, non-malicious nodes are forced to select their future back-offs from larger intervals after
every access failure. Therefore the chance of their accessing the channel becomes even smaller. Apart from
intentional selection of small back-off values, a node can deviate from the MAC protocol in other ways as
well. He can choose a smaller size of contention window or he may wait for shorter interval than DIFS, or
reserve the channel for larger interval than the maximum allowed network allocation vector (NAV) duration.
In this work, we will adhere to protocol deviations that occur due to manipulation of the back-off value,
since the other types of misbehavior have been properly addressed in [22, 4].
The nodes that are instructed by the protocol to defer transmission are able to overhear transmissions
from nodes whose transmission range they reside in. Therefore, silenced nodes can observe the behav-
ior of transmitting nodes. The question that arises is whether there exists a way to take advantage of this
observation capability and use it to identify potential misbehavior instances. If observations indicate a mis-
behavior event, the observer nodes should notify the rest of the network about this situation or could launch
a response action in order to isolate the misbehaving nodes. Detecting misbehavior is not straightforward
even in the simplest case, namely that of unobstructed observations. The difficulty stems primarily from the
non-deterministic nature of the access protocol that does not lead to a straightforward way of distinguishing
between a legitimate sender, that happens to select small back-offs, and a misbehaving node that maliciously
selects small back-offs. The open wireless medium and the different perceived channel conditions at differ-
ent locations add to the difficulty of the problem. Additional challenges arise in the presence of interference
due to ongoing concurrent transmissions.
4 Preventing Misbehavior of a Single Node
As it has been mentioned, [18] requires the receiver to be trusted. This assumption is well suited for
infrastructure-based wireless networks, where the base station can be trusted. However, we consider ad
hoc networks where the receiver can misbehave by selectively assigning the back-off values to different
senders. Depending on the concrete situation, a receiver may benefit by assigning small back-off values to a
particular sender (when data from that particular sender needs to be received) or by assigning large back-off
values to different neighbors (when it wants to degrade overall performance of neighbors and improve its
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own throughput). Furthermore, existence of multiple sender-receiver pairs in the interference range of each
other creates additional security issues. More specifically, a malicious receiver D in Fig. 2 can overhear the
back-off value assigned to node A by node C and unilaterally select a back-off for node B in order to create






































Figure 2: Node C transmits to A and node B wants to transmit to D. After hearing the back-off assigned by
A to C, node D assigns a back-off to node B such that it collides with C.
In this section we propose an extension to the IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol that ensures a uniformly
distributed random back-off, when at least one of the parties is honest. The basic idea follows the protocol
for flipping coins over the telephone by Blum [7]. The adopted approach is that the sender and the receiver
agree through a public discussion on a random value. The main property of the protocol is that an honest
party will always be sure that the agreed value is truly random. For an honest sender this means that he can
expect a fair treatment in order to access the channel. On the other hand, an honest receiver can monitor the
behavior of the sender (as in [18]) and report a misbehaving node to the reputation management system.
It has been mentioned in the introduction that Blum’s protocol can be used to select the seed for a pseu-
dorandom number generator. However,the four way handshake in the IEEE 802.11 that is used every time
a new reservation of the channel takes place is particularly well suited for implementing Blum’s protocol as
a way of selecting the next back-off value for a node. Selecting the next back-off value in each reservation
round, as opposed to selecting a seed for a pseudorandom number generator, has the advantage that there
need not be any synchronization between nodes keeping states of random number generators for the other
participating nodes (each node would need to keep the seed and the current state of the random generator for
other nodes). Furthermore, selecting the next back-off value in each channel reservation, allows any node
in the neighborhood to monitor the behavior of the parties accessing the channel, a feature that will be of
importance in the next section.
The protocol can be described as follows (the extra messages are appended -denoted by a double bar ||-





−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ r←{0, . . . ,W −1}
CT S||σ
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− σ = Commit(r||n)
r′ ← {0, . . . ,W −1}
DATA||r′




bi = ri⊕ r′i bi = ri⊕ r′i
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
We now explain the protocol step by step.
1. In the first step the sender S selects a nonce: a number n selected uniformly at random from the set
{0,1, . . . ,2knonce}, (denoted as n← {0,1}knonce ). knonce is a security parameter indicating the level of
difficulty of guessing n. For example knonce can be 64. This step is done in order to prevent an off-line
attack on the commitment scheme.
2. In the second step the receiver R selects a random back-off r from the set {0,1, . . . ,W − 1} and
commits to it. In binary notation r is a random bit string of length m (r = r1r2 · · · rm), where m =
log2W (note that the contention window size W is always a power of two). The commitment scheme
Commit is such that the following two properties are satisfied (at least before the time-out for channel
reservation: 300µs−350µs):
Binding: After sending Commit(r||n), the receiver cannot open the commitment to a different value
r̃ = r (except with negligible probability). This protects against a dishonest R that might try to
change the committed value depending on the r′ received by S.
Hiding: Given Commit(r||n), S cannot extract any information about r that will enable it to distin-
guish r from any other bit string of length m (except with negligible probability). This protects
against a dishonest S that will try to tailor r′ based on its guess of r.
3. After receiving the commitment σ, S selects a random value r′ = r′1r′2 · · · r′m from {0,1, . . . ,W −1}.
4. Finally R opens its commitment to S. Opening a commitment is an operation that reveals the com-
mitted value r and some additional information to S. This enables the other party to verify that the
revealed and committed values are the same. If the value opened by the R is correct, both sender and
receiver compute the back-off b = b1b2 · · ·bm as the xor of the bits: bi = ri⊕ r′i. Otherwise, the sender
can report misbehavior of the node to the reputation management system.
Several commitment schemes are known under very different computational assumptions. Very efficient
commitment schemes in terms of computation and communication, can be implemented under the random
oracle model. In this setting it is a standard practice to assume that hash functions H such as SHA-1
or MD5 are random oracles. Under this assumption it is easy to confirm that the following commitment







Output = (i, r)
where k is a security parameter (e.g. k = 64). To open the commitment, R has to send both r and i so that S
can check validity of the commitment.
We now consider 802.11 with Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) physical layer. In DSSS mode
the minimum contention window size is 32 time slots, therefore m = log2W = 5, that is, r
′ and r are only 5
bits long which is an insignificant quantity to be appended to a DATA frame. The acknowledgement frame
is appended k + m = 69 bits.
If we use SHA-1 to implement the hash function of the commitment then we obtain a message digest
of 160 bits. The CT S frame is doubled in size if the full message digest is used. If doubling the size of a
CTS frame is a concern, the output of SHA-1 can always be truncated (for example to 80 bits). The security
reduction of the message digest has to be evaluated under the birthday paradox: if the message digest has h
bits, then it would take only about 2h/2 messages (out of 2k+m+knonce ), chosen at random, before one would
find two (inputs) with the same value (message digest). Considering the normal timeout between frames to
be 300µs, we can safely assume 240 computations cannot be done in this time. Finally the nonce parameter
should discourage off-line attacks, with for example knonce = 64.
In this section we have thus introduced an efficient mechanism to guarantee honest back-off assignments
in distributed environments. The computational and communication complexities of our proposed algorithm
are kept to the minimum by the use of efficient primitives such as hash functions, and by adding only a small
payoff to each message exchange. Once the sender and the receiver have agreed on a given back-off value,
each of them can report misbehavior by using the same detection algorithm as the one proposed in [18].
5 Optimal Detection of Misbehaving Colluding Nodes
The problem treatment above assumed the existence of a single attacker and did not include the scenario of
colluding nodes. To illustrate the difference between detection of a single attacker and colluding attackers




























Figure 3: Nodes M and D collude and interfere in the communication path of nodes B and C.
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We assume that node C is in the wireless range of M and D and that it is capable of monitoring access
times of its neighboring nodes. When M reserves the channel following the protocol described in the pre-
vious section, any neighboring node can compute M’s exact back-off values by listening to the exchanged
values n,σ,r′,σ′ (between M and and the receiver) and then computing the back-off as bi = ri⊕ r′i. How-
ever, nodes D and M may collude and deny network access to nodes B and C. This effect can be easily
achieved when back-off values of both sender and receiver are selected a priori (i.e. when both nodes select
the back-off values using a pre-specified p.d.f.). Obviously, the previously outlined monitoring procedure
does not work in this case due to the fact that both the sender and the receiver follow the specific sequence
of back-off values that have been assigned a priori. For example, they can collude by selecting back-off






←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− σ = Commit(00000||n)
DATA||00000
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ σ′ = Open(σ)
ACK||σ′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b = 00000 b = 00000
In this scenario the sender chooses the back-off period equal to zero and sends immediately upon the
expiration of its DIFS period. In Figure 4 we show how the sequence of small backoffs 0,1,2, . . . from node
M causes the timer for the CTS frame of node A to time out. Node A will therefore back-off repeatedly,
making it less likely to access the network.






























Figure 4: Nodes M and D collude and select a very small back-off, thereby denying access to node A by
causing CTS timeouts.
Obviously, node C cannot detect misbehavior by observing whether nodes D and M deviate from agreed
back-off values and other detection procedures need to be applied.
5.1 Detection and Attack Assumptions
We now consider detection strategies in the presence of an intelligent misbehaving node: a node that is aware
of the existence of monitoring neighboring nodes and adapts its access policy in order to avoid detection. In
general, we adopt the following assumptions about the colluding nodes:
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1. They are knowledgeable, i.e. they know everything a monitoring node knows about the detection
scheme.
2. They are intelligent, i.e. they can make inferences about the situation in the same way as the monitor-
ing nodes can.
Therefore we assume that the goal of the misbehaving hosts is to choose an optimal attack strategy that
minimizes the probability of detection PD (or equivalently a strategy that maximizes the probability of
avoiding detection PM), while maximizing their gain (access to the channel).
However, it is difficult to come up with a universal access policy for misbehaving nodes due to the
random nature of the wireless channel and the nature of the access protocol itself. A naive detection system
may assume that the misbehaving nodes always select small back-off values. This strategy can be modeled
with a scheme that selects backoffs uniformly from the set {0,1, . . . ,W/4}. Given this model, the detector
raises an alarm when any of the monitored nodes back-off in the interval [0,W/4] for k consecutive times
(where k is chosen given an acceptable false alarm rate PFA). However, an intelligent misbehaving node can
easily defeat this detection mechanism by selecting k−1 backoffs equal to zero and selecting a value above
W/4 as the kth back-off.
Therefore, our desired detection procedure has to fulfill two basic conditions:
• decisions about the occurrence of misbehavior should be robust, i.e. they need to perform well for a
wide range of attack strategies
• decisions should be performed on-line as the observations are revealed to facilitate the quickest attack
detection given the desired performance in terms of the false alarm rate PFA and the probability of
missing the detection of misbehavior PM.
The first condition gives rise to the application of a minimax formulation that identifies the rule that
optimizes worst-case performance over the class of allowed uncertainty conditions. A minimax formulation
translates to finding the detection rule with the minimum required number of observations to reach a decision
for the worst instance of misbehavior. Clearly, such scheme guarantees a minimum level of performance
which is the best minimum level possible over all classes of attacks.
The second condition implies that sequential detection procedures need to be used. A sequential decision
rule consists of a stopping time which indicates when to stop observing and a final decision rule that indicates
which hypothesis (i.e, occurrence or not of misbehavior) should be selected. A sequential decision rule is
efficient if it can provide reliable decision as fast as possible. It has been shown by Wald [27] that the
decision rule that minimizes the expected number of required observations to reach a decision over all
sequential and non-sequential decision rules is the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT).
5.1.1 The SPRT
The SPRT collects observations until significant evidence in favor of one of the two hypotheses is accumu-
lated. After each observation at the k-th stage, we choose between the following options: accept one or the
other hypothesis and stop collecting observations, or defer decision for the moment and obtain observation
k + 1. The SPRT has two thresholds a and b that aid the decision. The figure of merit at each step is the
logarithm of the likelihood ratio of the accumulated sample vector until that stage. For the case of test-
ing between hypotheses H0 (normal behavior) and H1 (misbehaving node) that involve probability density
functions f0 and f1, the logarithm of likelihood ratio at stage k with accumulated samples x1, . . . ,xk is
Sk = ln
f1(x1, . . . ,xk)
f0(x1, . . . ,xk)
, (1)
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where fi(x1, . . . ,xk) is the joint probability density function of data (x1, . . . ,xk) based on hypothesis Hi,













with fi(·) the probability density function of hypothesis Hi, i = 0,1. The decision is taken based on the
criteria:
Sk ≥ a ⇒ accept H1,
Sk < b ⇒ accept H0, (3)
b≤ Sk < a ⇒ take another observation.
Thresholds a and b depend on the specified values of PFA and PM. From Wald’s identity [27]
E[SN ] = E[N]×E[Λ] (4)
where E[Λ] is the expected value of the logarithm of the likelihood ratio. By using a similar derivation as
the one in [15, pp.339-340], we can derive the following inequalities
1−PM ≥ eaPFA and PM ≤ eb(1−PFA), (5)
where a and b are the thresholds of SPRT. When the average number of required observations is very large,
the increments Λ j in the logarithm of likelihood ratio are also small. Therefore, when the test terminates
with selection of hypothesis H1, SN will be slightly larger than a, while when it terminates with selection of
H0, SN will be very close to b. Therefore, the above inequalities hold to a good approximation as equalities.





and b = ln
PM
1−PFA . (6)
Following the derivations of [27, 15],
E[SN ] = aPD + b(1−PD) (7)
where PD = 1−PM is the probability of detection of SPRT.
5.2 Minimax Robust Detection Approach
Previously, we stressed the sequential nature of our approach and the implicit need to consider most signif-
icant attacks that result in higher chances of channel access for the attacker. An attack in that class would
have most devastating effects for the network, in the sense that it would deny channel access to the other
nodes and would lead to unfair sharing of the channel. Besides, if we assume that the detection of an attack
is followed by communication of the attack event further in the network so as to launch a network response,
it would be rather inefficient for the algorithm to consider less significant (and potentially more frequent)
attacks and initiate responses for them. Instead, it is meaningful for the detection system to focus on en-
countering the most significant attacks and at the same time not to consume resources of any kind (processor
power, energy, time or bandwidth) for dealing with attacks whose effect on performance is rather marginal.
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The approach should also cope with the encountered uncertain operational environment of a wireless
network, namely the random nature of protocols and the unpredictable misbehavior or attack instances.
Hence, it is desirable to rely on robust detection rules that would perform well regardless of uncertain
conditions. In this work, we adopt the minimax robust detection approach where the goal is to optimize the
performance for the worst-case instance of uncertainty. More specifically, the goal is to identify the least
favorable operating point of a system in the presence of uncertainty and subsequently find the strategy that
optimizes system performance when operating in that point. In our case, the least favorable operating point
corresponds to the worst-case instance of an attack and the optimal strategy amounts to the optimal detection
rule. System performance is measured in terms of number of missed attacks, the number of false alarms and
number of required observation samples to derive a decision.
A basic notion in minimax approaches is that of a saddle point. A strategy (detection rule) d∗ and an
operating point (attack) f∗ in the uncertainty class form a saddle point if:
1. For the attack f∗, any detection rule d other than d∗ has worse performance. Namely d∗ is the optimal
detection rule for attack f∗ in terms of number of minimum number of required observations.
2. For the detection rule d∗, any attack f other than f∗ gives better performance. Namely, detection rule
d∗ has its worst performance for attack f∗.
We now describe formally our approach. Let hypothesis H0 denote legitimate operation and thus the
corresponding pdf f0 is the uniform one. Let also Hypothesis H1 correspond to misbehavior with unknown
pdf f (·).
Given the maximum allowed false alarm rate (PFA) and missed detection rate (PM), the objective of a
sequential detection rule is to minimize the number of the required observation samples N so as to derive
a decision regarding the existence or not of misbehavior. The performance is therefore quantified by the
average number of samples E[N] needed until a decision is reached, where the average is taken with respect
to the distribution of the observations. This number is a function of the adopted decision rule d and the
attack p.d.f f , that is
E[N] = φ(d, f ). (8)
Let D denote the class of all (sequential and non-sequential) statistical hypothesis tests d for which the
false alarm and missed detection probabilities do not exceed some specified levels PFA and PM respectively.
Generally, a hypothesis test consists of a decision function g(·) that acts on a set of k observations (taking
values in Ω) and takes values in the set of hypotheses, i.e, g : Ωk → {H0,H1}. Let G be the space of
all decision functions. A sequential test is a pair (gT (·),T ) where T is the stopping time and gT (·) is the
decision function that acts on observation samples collected up to time T . Thus, D = G
S
(G × [0,∞]).
In the context of the minimax robust detection framework, the problem is to optimize performance in the





φ(d, f ) , (9)
assuming that finite number of samples are needed (otherwise the “min-max” notation should change to
“inf-sup”). We proceed to a formal definition of a saddle point.
Definition 1 A pair (d∗, f ∗) is called a saddle point of the function φ if
φ(d∗, f )≤ φ(d∗, f ∗)≤ φ(d, f ∗) ∀d ∈D, ∀ f ∈ Fη. (10)
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A saddle point (d∗, f ∗) of φ consists of a detection test d∗ and an attack distribution f∗. In order to find
the solution of problem (9), we find the saddle point of φ.
However, as we now show, finding the detection strategy satisfying the saddle point is easy (if we have
f ∗). First, recall that the optimal detection test in the sense of minimizing expected number of samples
needed for detection is the SPRT. This means that the SPRT is the test d∗ ∈ D , such that for a fixed (but
unknown) attack f we have φ(d∗, f ) ≤ φ(d, f ) for all other tests d ∈ D . The inequality above also holds
for f = f ∗, and hence the second inequality in (10) has been established. Therefore in the remainder of
this paper we focus on how to obtain the worst attack distribution f∗ satisfying the first equality of equation
(10).
5.2.1 Definition of the Uncertainty Class
Implicit in the minimax approach is the assumption that the attacker has full knowledge of the employed
detection rule. Thus, it can create a misbehavior strategy that maximizes the number of required samples
for misbehavior detection delaying the detection as much as possible. Therefore, our approach refers to the
case of an intelligent attacker that can adapt its misbehavior policy so as to avoid detection. One issue that
needs to be clarified is the structure of this attack strategy. Subsequently, by deriving the detection rule and
the performance for that case, we can obtain an upper bound on performance over all possible attacks.
According to the IEEE 802.11 MAC standard, the back-off for each legitimate node is selected from a set
of values in a contention window interval based on a uniform distribution. The length of contention window
is 2iW for the ith retransmission attempt, where W is the minimum contention window. In general, some
back-off values will be selected uniformly from [0,W ] and others will be selected uniformly from intervals
[0,2iW ], for i = 1, . . . , Imax where Imax is the maximum number of re-transmission attempts. Without loss
of generality, we can scale down a back-off value that is selected uniformly in [0,2iW ] by a factor of 2i,
so that all back-offs can be considered to be uniformly selected from [0,W ]. This scaling property emerges
from the linear cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution. An attack strategy is mapped to
a probability density function based on which the attacker selects the back-off value. Although the possible
back-off values are discrete, without loss of generality we use continuous distributions to represent attacks
in order to facilitate mathematical treatment and to demonstrate better the problem intuition. We consider
continuously back-logged nodes that always have packets to send. Thus, the gain of the attacker is signified
by the percentage of time in which it obtains access to the medium. This in turn depends directly on the
relative values of back-offs used by the attacker and by the legitimate nodes. In particular, the attacker
competes with the node that has selected the smallest back-off value out of all nodes.
Assume that a misbehaving and legitimate node intend to access the channel. In order to have a fair
basis for comparison, assume that they start their back-off timers at the same time and that none of the
counters freezes due to a perceived busy channel. Let the random variable X0 stand for the back-off value of
legitimate user, hence it is uniformly distributed in [0,W ]. Also, let the random variables X1 and X2 stand for
the misbehaving nodes (attackers), with unknown pdf f12(x1,x2) with support [0,W ]. The relative advantage
of the attacker is quantified as the probability of accessing the channel, or equivalently the probability that
its back-off is smaller than that of the legitimate node, Pr(X0 < min(X1,X2)).
Suppose that all nodes were legitimate. If p is the access probability of each node, then the probability
of successful channel access achieves fairness for p∗ = 1/3 for each node. Now, if two nodes collude, they
receive gain from their attack if Pr(X0 < min(X1,X2))≤ η3 . In order to quantify this, let η ∈ [0,1] and define














This class includes attacks for which the incurred relative gain compared to legitimate operation exceeds a
certain amount. The class Fη is the uncertainty class of the robust approach and the parameter η is a tunable
parameter. By defining the class Fη, we imply that the detection scheme should focus on attacks with larger
impact to system performance and not on small-scale or short-term attacks.
5.2.2 Derivation of the worst-case attack
Assuming that the SPRT is used, we seek an attack distribution f∗ such that φ(d∗, f ∗) ≥ φ(d∗, f ) for all
other attacks f ∈ Fη.










where f0(xi) = 1/W (denotes the uniform distribution of normal operation), C = aPD + b(1−PD), and the
expectation in the denominator is with respect to the unknown attack distribution f . Since C is a constant, the







f12(x1x2) ln f12(x1x2)dx1dx2 (13)












f12(x1x2)dx1dx2 ≤ η3 (15)
The first constraint enforces the fact that f is a pdf and the second one holds due to the fact that f ∈
Fη. By applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we find that the function f∗12(x1,x2) has the
following form:
f ∗12(x1,x2) = e
−1−λe−µmin(x1,x2)/W (16)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the constraints and are functions of W
and η only. These can be obtained by the system of equations:





(2e−µ + µe−µ−2+ µ) = η
3
e1+λ
Interestingly, Eq. 16 shows that the worst-case attack distribution f∗12 is an exponential distribution.
Since φ(d∗, f ∗) ≥ φ(d∗, f ) for all f ∈ Fη, we proved the left inequality in (10). We have now shown
that the pair (d∗, f ∗), where d∗ is SPRT and f ∗(x) is the exponential density constitute a saddle point of φ.
This means that the so-called minimax equality holds and we can interchange the order of min and sup in





φ(d, f ) (18)
15
has the same solution with (9).
As was mentioned above, the minimax robust detection approach captures the case of an intelligent
adaptive attacker. The SPRT algorithm is part of the intrusion detection system module that resides at an
observer node. In other words, the observer (and hence the system) attempts to minimize the number of
required samples so as to improve its payoff in terms of improved chances for channel access. On the other
hand, an intelligent attacker that knows the detection algorithm attempts to delay this decision as much as
possible so as to increase his own benefit in terms of chances for channel access. The attacker aims at a
strategy that causes performance degradation for other nodes by remaining undetected.
Therefore, by using the optimal pdf f∗12(x1,x2), the attackers agree on the sequence of optimal backoffs.
In order to quantify the performance of the attackers we introduce the misbehavior coefficient ε = 1−η,
ε∈ [0,1]. Obviously, the value of ε = 0 corresponds to normal behavior (no additional gain for the attackers)
and the value of ε = 1 corresponds to the equivalent of a DoS attack, that is, when the colluding attackers
gain total control of the channel. Alternatively, we say that ε defines the class of attacks of interest since it
specifies the incurred relative gain of the attacker (or loss of the legitimate node). In that sense, η can be
interpreted as a sensitivity parameter of the detection scheme with respect to attacks, which is determined
according to the IDS requirements. IEEE 802.11 MAC is implemented and MATLAB is used to evaluate
the performance of our scheme, taking into account the sequence of observed backoffs.
The results of the above strategy are presented in Fig. 5, showing the dependence of the detection delay
and misbehavior coefficient.




























Figure 5: Average Detection Delay as a function of Misbehavior Coefficient ε for PFA = 0.01 and PD = 0.99.
As expected, the detection time decreases as the misbehavior increases, implying that the attackers
need to choose less aggressive access strategies in order to delay detection. Furthermore, we compare the
detection delay of colluding attackers to the detection delay of a single optimal attacker analyzed in [21].
We compare the performance of the attackers for different probabilities of channel access in Fig. 6. As
expected, the colluding attackers incur larger detection delay for identical channel access probabilities. We
also need to note that a large probability of access signifies a class of increasingly aggressive attacks for
which the detection is achieved with very small delay. It is also interesting to mention that the detection
delay between a single attacker and the colluding attackers decreases as the aggressiveness of the attack
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increases, bringing the difference close to zero for the DoS attacks.






























Figure 6: Average Detection Delay for single attacker and colluding attackers for PFA = 0.01 and PD = 0.99.
To facilitate a more realistic scenario, we implemented the above setting in the network simulator Op-
net, and allowed the colluding nodes to transmit with the smallest back-off in a period of time. Figure 7
illustrates the effects of colluding nodes on throughput of node A during the duration of an attack when
η = 0. Naturally, this behavior denies channel access to the legitimate node for the whole duration of the
transmission.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Misbehavior at the MAC layer achieved by changing the back-off mechanism can lead to performance
degradation and even DoS attacks in ad hoc networks. In this paper we have presented an algorithm based
on Blum’s protocol, in order to prevent misbehavior of non-colluding selfish nodes. A far more challenging
problem arises when two or more nodes collude in order to obtain more than fair share of channel access.
Our approach encompasses the case of intelligent colluding attackers that adapt their misbehavior strategy
with the objective to remain undetected as long as possible. We cast the problem within a minimax robust
detection framework, characterize the worst-case misbehavior strategy showing that the optimal detection
rule is the SPRT. Clearly, if the attacker is ignorant of the detection mechanism, the number of required
observations to detect it under the same values of PD and PFA is smaller than the corresponding value for the
adaptive attacker. Our results can thus shed light in the characterization of fundamental performance limits
in terms of accuracy or detection delay for misbehavior detection.
Our work constitutes the first step towards building a theoretical framework for studying the structure
of network attacks in the presence of colluding nodes. We assumed continuously backlogged nodes and
used channel access probability as a means of measuring the benefit of the attacker and corresponding
performance loss of legitimate nodes. Implicitly, we assumed that fair sharing of the medium is reflected by
this measure. However, fair sharing also involves the intention of a node to send a packet and therefore it
is affected by packet arrivals from higher layers and backlogs at different nodes. This introduces the issue
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Figure 7: Simulation of traffic sent by node M (top figure) versus traffic sent by node B (top figure). When
D and M collude by selecting η = 0, A is denied access to the network.
of throughput fairness and throughput benefit. The attacker causes more damage to the system if it prevents
legitimate nodes from transmitting their payload.
The treatment of more than one attacker in the network presents the first step in quantifying the benefits
of co-operation of intelligent attackers and its effects on performance degradation of legitimate nodes.
Finally, it would be very interesting to extend our approach and obtain results in the context of more
sophisticated MAC protocols such as 802.11e with the special features regarding back-off control and dif-
ferentiation in channel access opportunities that are incorporated in its enhanced DCF (EDCF) operation
mode.
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